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Abstract 
This brief paper aims to describe key aspects of employment in Greece, 
to  provide  some  information  on  levels  of,  and  trends  in,  non-standard 
work  in  Greece,  to  elaborate  on  the  nature  and  characteristics  of 
different types of such work, to analyse existing social policies to protect 
the workers concerned, and to speculate on future developments. 
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Social protection of non-standard work in Greece 
  
1. Employment in Greece 
A quick look at key indicators reveals that the poor performance of the Greek labour 
market in terms of low employment and high unemployment is something affecting 
not so much male breadwinners but so-called secondary earners. In fact, according 
to figures published in the “Employment in Europe 2009” report, employment rates 
in Greece for men aged 25-54 in 2008 were high: 90.2%, compared to 87.6% in the 
EU-15 (and 86.9% in the EU-27). In contrast, female employment was rising (from 
40.5% in 1998) but still low (48.7% of all women aged 15-64 in 2008, compared to 
60.4%  in  the  EU-15  and  59.1%  in  the  EU-27).  Moreover,  unemployment  was  high 
among the young (22.1% in the 15-24 age group) or among women (11.4% vs. 5.1% for 
men), and highest among young women (28.9% in the 15-24 age group). 
 
Youth (non-)employment 
Young workers fare badly in the Greek labour market. As discussed later on, youth 
unemployment is projected to rise sharply under the impact of the current crisis. 
Naturally, most persons aged 15-24 are in education or training rather than in the 
labour  market.  However,  according  to  the  OECD  “Jobs  for  youth:  Greece”  2010 
report,  the  proportion  of  those  in  the  15-24  group  not  in  employment  nor  in 
education or training (termed “NEET”) in Greece was 13% in 2007, above the OECD 
average of about 11% but down markedly from 18% in 1997. 
Data from the European Union Labour Force Survey, analysed in Ward et al. 
(2006),  show  that,  even  at  older  ages,  poor  employment  prospects  combine  with 
various other factors to cause the proportion of youth living in their parental home in 
Greece to rise steadily over the last decades: from 35.5% in 1985 to 48.8% in 1995 
and 57.8% in 2005 in the 25-29 age group; and from 21.3% in 1985 to 24.7% in 1995 
and 31.6% in 2005 in the 30-34 age group. At age 30 to 34, a staggering 43% of not-so-
young Greek men still lived in the parental home in 2005 – a performance exceeding 
even  that  of  their  Italian  counterparts  (38.3%).  While  this  phenomenon  has  not 
received the attention it deserves, the low probability of finding a good job (defined 
in terms of pay as well as security), even after a prolonged period of study and the 
accumulation of a string of formal qualifications, is often cited as a key factor. 
   
Labour market segmentation 
A key feature of the Greek labour market is the very deep divide that exists between 
hyper-protected insiders, under-protected “mid-siders” and un-protected outsiders. 
On the one hand, jobs in the public sector provide family wages, generous social 
benefits, lax work practices and absolute employment protection. According to the 
2008 Labour Force Survey, the public sector employed 1,018,000 workers in 2007, or 
35.1% of all wage earners. Until recently, state-controlled banks and public utilities 
offered employees a similar deal. However, as a result of partial privatisation and 
liberalisation  of  the  respective  sectors,  the  degree  of  hyper-protection  is  being   2
reduced (especially for younger and/or newly-hired workers). 
On the other hand, for the overwhelming majority of Greek workers, typically 
employed  in  small  firms,  jobs  pay  on  average  less,  and  come  with  less  generous 
benefits and reduced employment protection. What is more, in certain sectors of the 
economy  (such  as  the  construction  industry,  tourism  and  other  services)  informal 
employment is the norm, allowing many employers to flout regulatory constraints in 
the form of dismissal protection, minimum wage and social insurance. 
Both pay and conditions are much better in the public sector, whereas labour 
productivity is widely perceived to be lower. In terms of job security, civil servants 
and  most  other  public  sector  workers  enjoy  tenure.  In  the  private  sector,  older 
employees who have been with large firms for a long time are offered considerable 
protection against dismissal and, in the event, substantial severance pay (though not 
as substantial as in the public sector). Elsewhere, job security is much reduced or 
non-existent. 
In terms of pay, a recent study (Mitrakos et al. 2010) found that the public-
private  sector  pay  gap  (adjusted  for  skills  and  other  worker  characteristics)  for 
recent university graduates grows wider with time, and is larger for women than for 
men. Furthermore, social rights (including, crucially, pension rights) are much more 
favourable  for  public  sector  workers,  at  least  under  current  arrangements:  other 
things being equal, private sector workers can expect to retire later, and on lower 
retirement benefits, than their counterparts in the public sector. 
Because  of  this  divide,  public  sector  jobs  are  much  coveted,  especially  by 
young persons in general and university graduates in particular: 5 to 7 years from 
graduation, an estimated 40% of university graduates are in fact employed by the 
public sector (Karamessini 2008). 
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to imply that non-standard work is entirely 
absent in the public sector: according to estimates of the union-affiliated Labour 
Institute, 11% of part-time workers and 28% of those temporarily employed in 2009 
worked in the public sector. 
 
2. Levels and trends of non-standard work 
Non-standard  work  in  Greece  is,  as  elsewhere, widely thought to be on the rise. 
Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  some  recent  interest  in  “the  new  précariat”,  and  the 
abundance  of  anecdotal  evidence,  not  much  is  available  by  way  of  hard  data.  I 
attempt to summarise below what we do know about the levels of, and trends in, 
non-standard work in Greece. 
 
Part-time work 
According  to  the  “Employment  in  Europe  2009”  report,  part-time  employment  in 
Greece corresponded to 5.6% of total employment in 2008. This compared to 21.0% in 
the  EU-15  (18.2%  in  the  EU-27).  Part-time  work  was  significantly  more  prevalent 
among women (9.9%) than among men (2.8% of total employment). Compared to a 
decade earlier, part-time employment seems to be stable, as it also stood at 5.6% in   3
1998. Moreover, there was little variation in intermediate years.  
 
Fixed-term work 
The “Employment in Europe 2009” report provides data on the share of employees on 
fixed-term  contracts.  In  Greece,  11.5%  of  all  employees  were  on  fixed-term 
contracts in 2008. This was lower than, but closer to, the respective figures for the 
EU-15  (14.4%)  and  the  EU-27  (14.0%).  Fixed-term  contracts  were  more  common 
among  women  (13.7%)  than  among  men  (9.9%  of  all  employees).  Compared  to  a 
decade earlier, fixed-term work seems to have actually declined: it was 12.5% in 
1998, with little fluctuation in intermediate years from a high of 13.5% in 2000 to a 
low of 10.7% in 2007. 
On the evidence presented above, non-standard work does not seem to be very 
widespread,  at  least  compared  to  the  rest  of  the  EU,  nor  increasing  over  time. 
Nevertheless,  there  is  some,  mostly  indirect,  evidence  that  reality  is  a  bit  more 
complex.  Beyond  fixed-term  contracts  and  part-time  employment,  other  (one  is 
almost tempted to call these “non-standard”) types of non-standard work are often 
observed in the Greek labour market. Below I list some of the most common. 
 
Dependent work disguised as self-employment 
While  self-employment  has  always  been  widespread  in  Greece  (34.4%  of  all 
employment in 2008, compared to 14.1% in the EU-15), some of it involves “self-
employed  workers  providing  services  to  a  single  work  provider  in  a  continuous 
manner, hence acting de facto as employees” (OECD 2010). 
Although their exact number is unknown, some recent studies have attempted 
to throw light on this phenomenon. For instance, Karamessini (2008) estimated that 5 
to 7 years after graduation approximately 12% of Greek university graduates worked 
on  a  temporary  project  or  service  agreement  with  a  single  employer.  Also, 
Athanassouli  (2003)  found  that  27%  of  engineering  graduates  from  the  prestigious 
National  Polytechnic  of  Athens  worked  as  disguised  self-employed  on  graduation, 
most of them in full-time activity based on regularly renewed contracts with a single 
employer. Furthermore, Mouriki (2010) put their number at 270,000, to which she 
added another 70,000 workers doing piece-rate work at home as sub-contractors (in 
2008  the  total  number  of  employed  workers  in  Greece  was  4.76  million).  These 
workers, to all intents and purposes dependent employees, can apparently only find 
work  on  condition  that  they  register  as  self-employed,  thereby  allowing  their 
employers to save substantially on labour costs. As explained later, the implications 
of this arrangement for the workers themselves are job insecurity, no or very limited 
legal  protection  (e.g.  in  case  of  unfair  dismissal),  and  reduced  social  rights  – 
especially in case of sickness, maternity and unemployment. 
   
Agency work 
In line with Directive 91/383/EEC of 25 June 1991, temporary agency work can be 
defined as “a temporary employment relationship between a temporary work agency,   4
which is the employer, and a worker, where the latter is assigned to work for and 
under the control of an undertaking and/or establishment making use of his or her 
services (the user company)”. 
In Greece, law 2596/2001 establishes that agency workers must enjoy equal 
rights in terms of pay and conditions, as defined under collective agreements, and 
limits the maximum duration of such contracts to 12/18 months. In practice, these 
provisions are often ignored by employers. The number of agency workers fluctuates 
seasonally: estimates cited by Mouriki (2010) range between 10,000 and 30,000. 
 
Vocational training 
Vocational  training  in  Greece,  supported  by  various  EU  initiatives,  includes  the 
controversial Stage programme, originally intended to facilitate the employment of 
young workers in private firms. In its Greek version, an estimated 40,000 university 
graduates  were  until  recently  employed  in  public  sector  organisations  and  local 
authorities. Most of those concerned hoped their contracts would be converted to 
full tenure, even though explicitly fixed-term, as had happened before. The practice 
of using funds under the programme to create temporary jobs in the public sector 
was terminated by the incoming government in November 2009, amidst accusations 
of clientelist selection of beneficiaries under the previous government. The Stage 
saga is indicative of the key pathology of the labour market in Greece, namely the 
insider-outsider gap discussed earlier. 
 
Precarious work 
This is a different analytic category, partially overlapping with non-standard work. 
Mouriki (2010) cites estimates putting the number of workers in short-term, insecure 
and low-paid jobs in the formal sector at 400,000. To that she adds part-time and 
temporary  workers  (273,000  and  355,000  persons  respectively  in  mid-2009),  plus 
another 1 million undeclared and uninsured workers in the informal sector. Taken 
together,  she  reckons  precarious  work  accounts  for  40%  of  all  employment.  Even 
though this may seem excessive, and is not always well-documented (for instance, it 
is unclear if undeclared work is added to the denominator as well as the numerator), 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  precarious  work  is  widespread,  disproportionately 
affecting foreign workers, the young, and women. 
 
3. Nature and characteristics of non-standard work 
On the whole, non-standard work is often characterised by lower unionisation, lower 
pay, lower job protection, and lower social protection. The disadvantage of most 
non-standard workers in terms of job protection is almost self-evident, since ease of 
dismissal is what makes these jobs attractive to employers in the first place. Social 
protection is discussed in the next section. In this section I discuss low unionisation 
and low pay.   5
 
Unionisation 
As  I  have  discussed  elsewhere  (Matsaganis  2007),  an  analysis  of  membership 
composition, both at the grassroots and at leadership level, shows that the typical 
union  member  –  and  especially  union  leader  –  is  a  tenured  public  sector  worker, 
member of a special social insurance scheme, predominantly male, middle-aged and 
exclusively  Greek.  In  contrast,  the  typical  worker  is  younger,  employed  (often 
“flexibly”) by private firms, insured with the general social insurance scheme, in an 
increasingly  feminised  and  multi-ethnic  work  force.  Compared  to  their  European 
counterparts, Greek unions appear to be more unevenly spread between different 
segments of the labour market, and to have suffered a steeper fall in union density 
over  recent  years.  Outside  the  enclaves  of  civil  service,  banking  and  the  public 
utilities, in other words in the private firms employing the overwhelming majority of 
all wage earners in Greece, union density is very low: it was a mere 15.6% in 2004, 
and may have fallen below 10% in the meantime. 
In view of the above, many non-standard workers are exposed to what can only 
be called open exploitation on the part of employers. Anecdotal evidence shows that 
unpaid  overtime  work  has  become  the  norm,  even  in  major  banks  and  other 
reputable firms. Weaker workers (such as immigrant women) are required to sign a 
statement  on  being  hired  that  they  receive  pay  at  the  statutory  minimum  plus 
bonuses and other benefits as set out by labour legislation, whereas in fact none of 
this is true. At an extreme, those refusing to accept such terms, or attempting to 
organise  their  fellow  workers  in  any  sort  of  union  activity,  are  known  to  have 




According  to  Labour  Force  Survey  data  (elaborated  in  INE  2008),  57.5%  of  wage 
earners were paid less than €1,000 a month in 2007, while 26.3% were paid less than 
€750 (and 5.5% less than €500 a month). Note that the statutory minimum wage for 
an unskilled worker, with no work experience, no dependants, working full-time in 
2007 was €657.89 per month. 
Setting the low-pay threshold at monthly earnings of €750, the share of low-
 
1 One case in particular has become emblematic: “Konstantina Kuneva, a Bulgarian migrant 
worker and trade union leader, aged 45, was severely injured in the Greek capital, Athens, on 
22 December 2008 after being subjected to a sulphuric acid attack by unknown men, as she 
returned home from work. She lost her sight in one eye, has limited vision in the other, and 
her larynx, oesophagus and stomach were seriously damaged. A history teacher by profession, 
Konstantina Kuneva moved to Greece in 2001 to earn money for medical treatment for her 
son.  While  working  as  a  cleaner,  she  participated  in  trade  union  activities,  eventually 
becoming  Secretary  of  the  Attica  Union  of  Cleaners  and  Domestic  Workers.  The  attack 
followed  a  period  of rising tension between Konstantina Kuneva and her employer, during 
which  she  had  received  anonymous  threats  by  telephone.”  (Amnesty  International;  see 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/individuals-at-risk/write-for-rights/konstantina-kuneva).  Her  case 
remains  unsolved.  Note  that  her  employer  was  a  firm  providing  contracted-out  cleaning 
services to the state urban railways ΗΣΑΠ.   6
paid workers was 36.3% in the private sector compared to 8.7% in the public sector. 
Among permanent workers, the incidence of low pay was 33.1% in the private sector 
vs. 5.3% in the public sector. On the other hand, 55.7% of all temporary workers, and 
as many as 86.4% of all part-time workers, earned less than €750 a month, almost 
irrespective of whether employed in the private or the public sector. 
 
4. Policies to protect non-standard workers 
The excessive reliance of the Greek welfare state on contributory social insurance 
translates labour market disadvantage into reduced access to social protection. In 
other words, social insurance, rather than compensating for their difficulties in the 
labour market, actually penalises non-standard workers. As a matter of fact, while 
social insurance is perfectly suited to fordist norms of long, uninterrupted careers, it 
has  little  to  offer  those  with  atypical,  non-standard  employment  trajectories.  As 
discussed  earlier,  the  resulting  dualism  is  very  severe  in  Greece,  where  a  true 
polarisation exists between hyper-protected insiders, under-protected “mid-siders” 
and un-protected outsiders. The latter includes women and youth trying to enter or 
re-enter the labour market, precarious workers employed on a temporary or part-
time basis, immigrants in the shadow economy, as well as the long-term unemployed 
and others who lack access to secure jobs and therefore tend to lose out heavily in 
terms of welfare entitlements. 
The key issues here are lack of insurance, reduced access to unemployment 
allowances and other (so-called “short-term”) social benefits, and pension rights. 
 
Undeclared labour 
According to the Labour Force Survey, when asked of their social insurance coverage, 
approximately 4% of respondents tick the “no social insurance” box. Nonetheless, the 
real extent of uninsured labour must be much larger. A statement of the Minister of 
Labour and Social Insurance in response to a recent parliamentary question (12 May 
2010)  revealed  that  the  proportion  of  uninsured  workers  in  22,000  private  firms 
inspected by the Labour Inspectorate in the three months from February to April 
2010 was approximately 25%. 
Needless to add, undeclared workers can rely on few non-contributory benefits 
in case of need; perhaps little more than emergency treatments in public hospitals – 
and, if they happen to be undocumented migrants, not even that. 
In  an  attempt  to  encourage  private  individuals  occasionally  employing 
undeclared  workers  (such  as  nannies,  elderly  persons’  companions,  home  helpers 
etc.)  to  insure  them,  new  legislation  provides  for  the  introduction  of  a  voucher 
scheme. Under the provisions of the scheme, occasional employers will be required 
to buy (e.g. at kiosks) a voucher incorporating both daily pay at the minimum wage 
and  social  insurance  contributions.  The  worker  will  then  be  able  to  cash  in  the 
voucher,  at  the  same  time  securing  the  equivalent  of  one  work  day  worth  of 
contributions. 
   7
Access to unemployment and other benefits 
Because of institutional fragmentation, social insurance benefits vary widely in terms 
of  generosity  between  different  segments  of  the  labour  market.  Even though the 
general picture is quite complex, systematic cleavages can be identified between 
groups  of  workers.  In  general,  current  entitlements  are  more  favourable  for  the 
liberal professions compared to wage earners, for public sector employees relative to 
private  sector  ones,  for  unionised  rather  than  precarious  workers.  For  instance, 
sickness and maternity benefits are more generous for civil servants than for workers 
in private firms. Moreover, even though less generous, provisions as set out by law 
are  often  ignored  by  employers,  or  result  in  de  facto  discrimination  even  in  the 
formal labour market. This is the case of young married childless women who, as 
likely candidates for costly maternity leave, are considered by many employers as 
unemployable. 
As mentioned earlier, dependent workers disguised as self-employed are forced 
by  employers  to  register  with  the  social  insurance  organisation  for  independent 
workers (OAEE) rather than with the general scheme for private sector employees 
(IKA). In the typical case, the employer will pay a given sum and the worker will be 
left to bear the cost of social insurance or choose to remain uninsured. More rarely, 
the employer might agree to pay the equivalent of contributions to OAEE on top of 
what  passes  as  normal  remuneration.  From  the  point  of  view  of  employers,  both 
options  result  in  significant  reductions  in  non-wage  labour  costs  relative  to  what 
would have been the case had they insured their workforce with IKA. Moreover, by 
disguising their employees as freelance workers, employers are not bound to unfair 
dismissal legislation nor are liable for severance pay. Obviously, from the point of 
view of workers, being forced to disguise as self-employed leaves them ineligible for 
unemployment insurance, for sickness and maternity leave, and for severance pay. 
Workers losing their job can claim unemployment benefit if they were insured 
for at least 80 work days per year over the past two years and at least 125 work days 
over  the  previous  14  months.  Benefit  is  paid  for  a  minimum  of  5  months  and  a 
maximum of 12 months, depending on contributory record. In 2009, unemployment 
benefit was €454 per month, approximately 30% of the average wage. About 254,000 
workers claimed unemployment benefit in 2008. 
Moreover, young persons aged 20-29 are eligible for a less generous allowance 
of €73 per month for a maximum duration of five months, provided they have been in 
the unemployment registries for at least one year. The number of beneficiaries in 
2008 was just over 1,000 persons. OECD estimates, based on the European Union 
Labour  Force  Survey,  show  that  only  6%  of  unemployed  Greek  youth  received 
unemployment benefit in 2008. 
Unemployment  assistance,  aimed  for  the  long-term  unemployed,  was 
introduced  in  2002.  However,  because  of  very  stringent  eligibility  conditions,  the 
number of beneficiaries is extremely low: a mere 733 persons in 2008, corresponding 
to 0.5% of the long-term unemployed. Moreover, the benefit rate (€200 per month 
for a total period of 12 months) has remained unchanged in nominal terms since its 
introduction 8 years ago. 
Overall, as Karantinos (2006) has observed, the coverage of temporary workers   8
with unemployment benefits in Greece (38.1% in 2003) is the lowest among the EU 
countries for which comparable data exist. 
 
Pension rights 
As a general rule, non-standard work is penalised by social insurance in terms of 
pension  rights,  by  virtue  of  the  fact  that  interrupted careers, spells of part-time 
work,  long  periods  of  unemployment  and/or  informal  work  and  so  on  result  in 
reduced pension entitlements. This is even more so in the case of Greece where, as 
mentioned above, pension benefits for hyper-protected insiders are more generous 
by  design  relative  to  those  for  under-protected  “mid-siders”  and  un-protected 
outsiders. 
Contributory minimum pensions require a contributory record of 4,500 days (15 
years). In 2002, a lower-rate minimum pension was introduced for contributors who 
failed to meet the standard requirement, provided they had a contributory record of 
at least 3,500 days (11 years and 8 months). 
For elderly persons with an inadequate contributory record, a non-contributory 
social pension is available on a means-tested basis. In 2008, its value was €330 per 
month, and the number of recipients was approximately 66,000. 
A new pension bill was approved by a narrow majority on 8 July 2010 as Law 
3863. The new law provides for a radically reformed pension system from 2015, with 
a first-tier basic pension and a second-tier proportional pension. 
The basic pension, fixed at €360 per month in 2010 prices, paid 12 times a 
year, will be available with no means test to all recipients of a proportional pension 
with a contributory record of at least 15 years. The full rate will be payable at age 
65, reduced pro rata (by one thirty-fifth a year) for those who have been resident in 
the country for less than 35 years between the ages of 15 and 65. In cases of early 
retirement, the basic pension will be paid at a lower rate, reduced by 6% per each 
year short of age 65. Those with a shorter contributory record will still be eligible for 
the basic pension, but only if they pass a means test: personal income must be below 
€5,400 per year, family income below €10,800 per year (in 2010 prices). Neither the 
means-tested version of the basic pension nor the proportional pension for those with 
less than 15 years of contributions are payable before age 65. 
With  respect  to  the  proportional  pension,  accrual  rates  vary  by  length  of 
insurance period. The return on contributions will range from 0.8% per year for a 
contributor  with  less  than  15  insurance  years,  to  1.5%  per  year  for  one  with  40 
insurance years or more. While the new provision eliminates the blatant inequity of 
the previous one, the risk that low-paid workers with uncertain career prospects and 
insecure attachment to the labour market might see little incentive to pay pension 
contributions is still there, albeit in less severe form. 
To allay fears that the new structure may eventually not amount to much, a 
further  safety  net  has  been  introduced  in  the  form  of  a  minimum  pension. 
Specifically, those retiring with an insurance record of at least 15 years will have a 
guaranteed minimum pension equal to the equivalent of 15 minimum daily wages (as 
stipulated in the National Collective Labour Agreement for 2015). At present, this   9
would be worth €496 per month. 
Even though the provision of a quasi-universal basic pension sets the conditions 
for a more effective safety net in old age, it is feared that workers with interrupted 
careers and low earnings could face an increased risk of poverty in old age. 
 
5. Future developments 
From the beginning of 2010 Greece has been at the centre of financial turmoil due to 
its  burgeoning  €300  billion  public  deficit.  The  first  austerity  measures  were 
announced on 3 March 2010. As these failed to placate the markets, the government 
announced further measures on 2 May 2010, in order to secure a €110 billion three-
year bailout package from the EU and the IMF. The measures include pay cuts to the 
tune of 13% in the public sector, a progressive levy on pensions, and a 3-year freeze 
on pensions and public sector salaries; also, higher taxes and a more determined 
effort to combat tax evasion. 
While it is difficult to estimate the full effects of the crisis and the austerity 
measures  on  the  economy  and  the  labour  market,  it  is  clear  that  these  will  be 
severe. The OECD forecasts negative GDP growth in 2009 and 2010, a sharp rise in 
youth  unemployment  to  28.3%  in  2011  (from  22.0%  in  2008),  and  an  equally 
significant increase in rates of unemployment among prime-age workers (i.e. in the 
25-54 age group) from 6.6% in 2008 to 9.1% in 2011. 
As the celebrated economist and Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman has put it: 
“If  Greece  were  a  highly  cohesive  society  with  collective 
wage-setting, a sort of Aegean Austria, it might be possible 
to [confront the crisis] via a collectively agreed reduction in 
wages  across  the  board  –  an  ‘internal  devaluation’.  But  as 
today’s grim events  show, it isn’t.”
 2 
Clearly, in these conditions, as more and more employers seem determined to 
resort to non-standard work in order to soften the impact of the crisis, the chances 
of  a  negotiated  improvement  in  pay  and  conditions  for  non-standard  workers, 
possibly in the context of a relative relaxation of employment protection for core 
workers, are pretty remote. None of the necessary conditions for a successful exit 
strategy,  and  for  a  fair  allocation  of  the  costs  of  responses  to  the  crisis,  (trust 
between social partners, trade unions intent to promote the interests of all workers, 
employers prepared to respect the law) are in place, at least for the time being. 
Whether  the  crisis  itself  will  induce  a  change  in  behaviour  on  the  part  of  social 
partners,  rendering  everyone  more  public-spirited  and  responsible,  is  too  soon  to 
tell. 
 
2 The “grim events” he was referring to was the murder of three workers by demonstrators 
setting fire to a bank in the centre of Athens. His comment appeared in an entry to his New 
York Times blog “The Concience of a Liberal” dated 5 May 2010 and (ominously) titled “Greek 
End Game” (http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/05/greek-end-game/).   10
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